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ABSTRACT
The existing (election) voting systems, e.g., representative democ-
racy, have many limitations and often fail to serve the best interest
of the people in collective decision making. To address this issue,
the concept of liquid democracy has been emerging as an alterna-
tive decision making model to make better use of “the wisdom of
crowds”. Very recently, a few liquid democracy implementations,
e.g. Google Votes and Decentralized Autonomous Organization
(DAO), are released; however, those systems only focus on the
functionality aspect, as no privacy/anonymity is considered.
In this work, we, for the rst time, provide a rigorous study of
liquid democracy under the Universal Composability (UC) frame-
work. In the literature, liquid democracy was achieved via two
separate stages – delegation and voting. We propose an ecient
liquid democracy e-voting scheme that unies these two stages. At
the core of our design is a new voting concept called statement vot-
ing, which can be viewed as a natural extension of the conventional
voting approaches. We remark that our statement voting can be
extended to enable more complex voting and generic ledger-based
non-interactive multi-party computation. We believe that the state-
ment voting concept opens a door for constructing a new class of
e-voting schemes.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy → Public key encryption; Mathematical
foundations of cryptography; Distributed systems security;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Elections/Referendums provide people in each society with the op-
portunity to express their opinions in the collective decision making
process. The existing election/voting systems can be mainly divided
into two types, direct democracy and representative democracy. Al-
though the former one treats every voter equally, it is not scalable;
therefore, the latter one is widely used in most countries. However,
representative democracy has many limitations and it often fails to
serve the best interest of the people. For example, to make correct
decisions, the voters have to invest tremendous eort to analyze
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the issues. The cost of identifying the best voting strategy is high,
even if we assume that the voter has collected accurate information.
What’s worse, misinformation campaigns often inuence the voters
to select certain candidates which could be against the voters’ own
interests. In the past decades, the concept of liquid democracy [6]
has been emerging as an alternative decision making model to make
better use of collective intelligence. Liquid democracy is a hybrid of
direct democracy and representative democracy, where the voters
can either vote directly on issues, or they can delegate their votes
to representatives who vote on their behalf. Due to its advantages,
liquid democracy has received high attentions since the spread of
its concept; however, there is no satisfactory solution in the form of
either paper-voting or e-voting yet1. Is it possible to introduce new
technologies to circumvent the implementation barriers to liquid
democracy?
2 A NEW CONCEPT
We could approach the above problem via multiple angles. In this
paper, we propose a new and clean concept: statement voting. State-
ment voting can be viewed as a natural extension of traditional
candidate voting. Instead of dening a xed election candidate,
each voter can dene a statement in his or her ballot but leave the
vote “undened” during the voting phase. During the tally phase,
the (conditional) actions expressed in the statement will be carried
out to determine the nal vote. Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a
special case of statement voting, where the voters rank the election
candidates instead of naming only one candidate in their ballots.
The ranked candidate list together with the STV tally rule can be
viewed as an outcome-dependent statement. Roughly speaking, the
statement declares that if my favorite candidate has already won
or has no chance to win, then I would like to vote for my second
favorite candidate, and so on. In terms of liquid democracy, the
vote delegation can be expressed as a target-dependent statement,
where a voter can dene that his/her ballot is the same as the target
voter’s ballot. Of course, the target voter can also state whether
he/she is willing to be delegated in the ballot. To obtain the basic
intuition, let’s rst leave privacy aside and consider the following
toy example.
Example: Each ballot is in the form of (ID, action, target). If a voter
Vi is willing to be delegated, he/she sets ID := Vi ; otherwise, sets
ID := ⊥. If Vi wants to delegate his/her vote to another voter Vj ,
then the ballot is B := (ID, delegate,Vj ). If Vi wants to directly
1All the existing liquid democracy implementations, e.g., Google Votes and Decen-
tralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) do not consider privacy/anonymity. This
drawback prevents them from being used in serious elections. Here, we note that
straightforword blockchain-based solutions cannot provide good privacy in practice.
Although some blockchains such as Zerocash [1] can be viewed as a global mixer, they
implicitly require anonymous channels. While in practice, all the implementations of
anonymous channels suer from time leakage, i.e., the user’s ID is only hidden among
the other users who are also using the system at the same time. Subsequently, the
adversary can easily identify the user during quiet hours.
vote for vi , then the ballot is B := (ID, vote,vi ). Suppose there
are seven ballots: B1 := (V1, delegate,V7), B2 := (V2, vote,v2),
B3 := (V3, vote,v3), B4 := (⊥, vote,v4), B5 := (V5, delegate,V4),
B6 := (⊥, delegate,V3) and
B7 := (V7, delegate,V3). Here, the eective vote of B1 is dened
by B7, which is further dened by B3; note that B3 votes forv3; that
means, B7 votes for v3 by following B3. Now let’s consider B6: B6
follows B3; however, B6 is not willing to be followed by anyone; as
a result, B6 also votes for v3. Finally, let’s consider B5: B5 follows
B4; however, B4 is not willing to be followed by anyone; as a con-
sequence, B5 is re-dened as blank ballot, ⊥. After interpreting the
delegation statements, the nal votes are (v3,v2,v3,v4,⊥,v3,v3).
Careful readers may wonder why this type of natural voting idea
has never appeared in the physical world. Indeed, it is typically
not available in the real life. Dierent from the toy example, in the
reality, the voters care about privacy and anonymity. To ensure
anonymity, the voters are not willing to leave their identities in
the ballots. If no identities (or equivalences) are included in the
ballots, then it is dicult for voters to “follow” other voters’ choices.
The election committees might assign each voter a temporal ID to
achieve anonymity, but a voter needs to obtain the target voter’s
temporal ID in order to delegate his vote. This requires secure peer-
to-peer channels among all the voters, which is not practical. In
“our design” paragraph in the Introduction, we will present the rst
digital construction for implementing full-edged liquid democracy.
3 MODELING LIQUID DEMOCRACY VOTING
We for the rst time provide a rigorous modeling for liquid democ-
racy voting. More concretely, we model liquid democracy voting in
the well-known Universal Composability (UC) framework, via an
ideal functionality FLiqid. The functionality interacts with a set of
voters, trustees, and an auditor, and consists of preparation phase,
voting/delegation phase, and tally phase. During the preparation
phase, the trustees need to indicate their presence to FLiqid, and
the election/voting will not start until all the trustees have partici-
pated the preparation. During the voting/delegation phase, each
voter can either directly vote for the candidate(s) or delegate his
vote to another voter. In addition, each voter can use a ag α to
indicate whether he is willing to be delegated. Note that, when all
the trustees are corrupted, FLiqid leaks the voters’ ballots to the
adversary.
To model the privacy of mixing type of e-voting, we letFLiqid re-
place each voter’s ID with a pseudonym. The functionality FLiqid
then sorts the anonymized ballots lexicographically to hide the
order correspondence and reveal them to the adversary. Note that
this type of information leakage is consistent with the conventional
paper-based voting system, where a voter submits his ballot to a
ballot box and the ballot is mixed together with the other voters’
ballots. To model end-to-end veriability, we introduce an auditor
Au who will verify whether the election result is mis-presented.
Note that the auditor can be performed by any party, and here we
model auditor as a single entity for simplicity.
We emphasize that in practice, virtually all threshold crypto-
graphic systems suer from selective failure attacks; namely, dur-
ing the opening process of a threshold cryptographic system, the
last several share holders can jointly see the content to be opened
themselves before hand. Hence, they can decide if they want to
Functionality FLiqid
The functionality FLiqid interacts with a set of voters
V := {V1, . . . , Vn }, a set of trustees T := {T1, . . . , Tk }, an
auditor Au, and the adversary S. Let Vhonest, Vcorrupt and Thonest,
Tcorrupt denote the set of honest/corrupt voters and trustees,
respectively. FLiqid is parameterized by an algorithm TallyProcess,
a table Tab, and variables result, T1, T2, T3, and Bi for all i ∈ [n].
Initially, set result := ∅, T1 := ∅, T2 := ∅, T3 := ∅; for i ∈ [n], set
Bi := ∅.
Preparation:
(1) Upon receiving input (InitialTrustee, sid) from the
trustee Tj ∈ T, set T1 := T1 ∪ {Tj }, and send a noti-
cation message (InitialTrusteeNotify, sid, Tj ) to the
adversary S.
(2) Upon receiving input (InitialVoter, sid, η) from the
voter Vi ∈ V, if |T1 | < k , ignore the input.
Otherwise, send (InitialVoterNotify, sid, Vi ) to the ad-
versary S. If |Tcorrupt | = k , then additionally send a mes-
sage (DelLeak, sid, Vi , η) to the adversary S.
Upon receiving (VoterID, sid, Vi , wi ) from S,
if Vi ∈ Vcorrupt, then set Tab[i] := wi ;
otherwise, if Vi ∈ Vhonest and η = 0, then set Tab[i] := ⊥;
else, generate random temporal ID w ′i ← {0, 1}λ , and set
Tab[i] := w ′i .
Voting/Delegation:
(1) Upon receiving input (Delegate, sid, Vj ) from the voter
Vi ∈ V, if |T1 | < k , ignore the input. Other-
wise, record Bi := (Tab[i], delegate, Tab[j]); send a
message (ExecuteNotify, sid, Vi ) to the adversary S.
If |Tcorrupt | = k , then additionally send a message
(Leak, sid, Vi , Delegate, Vj ) to the adversary S.
(2) Upon receiving input (Vote, sid, vi ) from the the voter
Vi ∈ V, where vi ∈ V and V contains all pos-
sible votes, if |T1 | < k , ignore the input. Other-
wise, record Bi := (Tab[i], vote, vi ); send a mes-
sage (ExecuteNotify, sid, Vi ) to the adversary S. If
|Tcorrupt | = k , then additionally send a message
(Leak, sid, Vi , Vote, vi ) to the adversary S.
Tally:
(1) Upon receiving input (Mix, sid) from the the trustee Tj ∈
T, set T2 := T2 ∪ {Tj }. Send a notication message
(MixNotify, sid, Tj ) to the adversary S. If |T2 | = k , do
For i ∈ [n], if Bi is not dened, set Bi :=
(⊥, vote, ⊥).
Sort (B1, . . . , Bn ) lexicographically to form a new
ballot vector (B˜1, . . . , B˜n ).
(2) Upon receiving input (Tally, sid) from the trustee Tj ∈ T2.
Otherwise, set T3 := T3 ∪ {Tj }.
Send a notication message (TallyNotify, sid, Tj ) to S.
(3) If |T3 ∩ Thonest | + |Tcorrupt | = k ,
send (Reveal, sid, (B˜1, . . . , B˜n )) to S.
(4) If |T3 | = k ,
compute result ← TallyProcess((B˜1, . . . , B˜n ), Tab).
(5) Upon receiving input (ReadResult, sid) from a voter Vi ∈
V, if result = ∅, ignore the input.
Else, return (ResultReturn, sid, result) to Vi .
Figure 1: The voting functionality.
actually open the content. However, surprisingly, this subtle issue
was rarely modeled in the literature. For instance, the only previ-
ously known e-voting functionality [7] fails to address it. During
the tally phase, the tally will be released if all the trustees agree
to proceed. The formal description of the ideal functionality is
depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.
TallyProcess
Input: a set of ballots B := (B1, . . . , Bn ) and a set of voter labels
L := (V1, · · · , Vn )
Output: the tally result result
Label Check:
• Check the uniqueness of each label in L. If there exist
i1, . . . , it ∈ [n], i1 , i2 , · · · , it s.t. Vi1 = Vi2 = · · · =
Vit , then replace all the labels Vi1, . . . , Vit in B with ⊥.
Delegation statement interpretation:
• For each ballot Bi ∈ B, parse Bi in form of either
(Vi , delegate, Vj ) or (Vi , vote, vi ) and do the following:
If Bi is in form of (Vi , delegate, Vj ) and Vj , ⊥, try
to locate a ballot Bj in form of (Vj , ·, ·). If founded,
replace Bi := Bj ; otherwise, if Bi is in form of
(Vi , delegate, ⊥) set Bi := (Vi , vote, ⊥).
Repeat the above step, until Bi is in form of
(·, vote, ·). If there is a delegation loop, dene
Bi := (⊥, vote, ⊥).
• Denote the processed ballot set as B′ := (B′1, . . . , B′n ).
Tally computation:
• Compute and return result ← TallyAlg(B′1, . . . , B′n ),
where TallyAlg(·) is the original tally algorithm.
Figure 2: The extended tally processing algorithm.
4 OUR DESIGN
Our toy example shows that it is possible to interpret the delega-
tion statement by extending the tally algorithm. However, it is not
immediately obvious about how to apply the same technique in
conjunction with privacy. Before the voting/delegation phase, each
voter can pick a temporal ID. However, the main challenge here
is to distribute the temporal ID to the ones who need. The same
as all existing end-to-end veriable e-voting schemes, our design
requires a publicly accessible consistent bulletin board, modeled as
global functionality G¯BB. We let the voters post the re-randomizable
RCCA encryption of their temporal ID on the G¯BB. If voter Vi wants
to delegate his ballot to voter Vj , he can include a re-randomized
ciphertext of Vj ’s temporal ID. More specically, Vi sets his ballot
as Bi := (wi , delegate,Wj ), if he wants to delegate to Vj ; or he sets
Bi := (wi , vote,vi ), if he wants to vote for vi ; here wi is Vi ’s tem-
poral ID andWj is the re-randomized ciphertexts of Vj ’s temporal
ID. All the ballots will rst be shued via a mix-net, and then all the
trustees will jointly open those re-randomized ciphertexts inside
the ballots. Subsequently, we can handle the delegation statement
and compute the tally in the same way as the toy example. In the
full version, we also show how to implement the liquid democracy
voting scheme with re-randomizable threshold public key encryp-
tion (such as threshold ElGamal encryption) together with some
necessary non-interactive proofs.
5 DISCUSSION AND FURTHER REMARKS.
In this work, we initiate the study of statement voting and liquid
democracy. We remark that our statement voting concept can be
signicantly extended to support much richer ballot statements.
It opens a door for constructing a new class of e-voting schemes.
We also remark that this area of research is far from being com-
pleted, and our design and modeling ideas can be further improved.
For example, if there is a delegation loop in which a set of voters
delegate their votes to each other while no one votes, then what
should be the “right” policy? Should the ballots be reset as blank
ballots? This might not be ideal in reality. One possible approach is
to extend the delegation statement to include a default vote. When
a delegation loop exists, the involved ballots could be counted as
their default votes. We nally remark that, voting policies can be
heavily inuenced by local legal and societal conditions. How to
dene “right” voting policy itself is a very interesting question. We
believe our techniques here have the potential to help people to
identify suitable voting policies which can further eliminate the
barriers to democracy.
We remark that most non-trivial functionalities (including the
e-voting functionality) cannot be UC-realized in the plain model
[3–5]. Typically, we need trusted setup assumptions for UC secure
e-voting systems, and the Common Reference String (CRS) model
and the (Random Oracle) RO model are two common choices. In
practice, if an e-voting system uses CRS, then we need to trust the
party (parties) who generate(s) the CRS, which, in our opinion, is
a stronger assumption than believing no adversary can break a
secure hash function, e.g., SHA3. Therefore, we will realize our
liquid democracy voting system in the RO model.
Alternative approach is as follows: we rst use multiple party
computation to generate a CRS; then we construct liquid democracy
voting system by using the CRS. This approach has previously been
used for constructing anonymous cryptocurrency Zerocash [1];
please see Ben-Sasson et al’s recent eort [2]. We remark that,
this approach might be problematic for cryptocurrency systems:
typically a cryptocurrency system will last for many years and
it is very dicult to ensure there is no attack on the CRS during
this long time period. Interestingly, this limitation does not apply
to liquid democracy voting systems. If there is an issue with the
current CRS, we can use MPC to generate a new CRS.
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